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This short essay blends traditional Mexican cartel analysis indicative of earlier Small Wars Journal
writings by this author with advanced (5th dimensional) warfighting concepts. These concepts have utility 
for engagement with non-state (new warmaking) entities. They are being increasingly discussed now that 
cyberspace and dual dimensional operations are more frequently breaking out in the Mexican conflict.
The criminal insurgencies in Mexico are rapidly evolving with regard to media (informational) based 
conflict [1]. This is an outcome of an action-reaction (offensive and defensive) dynamic of the conflict 
that has transcended older forms of media (newspaper, radio, film, and television) into new media forms 
(websites, blogs, texts, tweets, et al.).
Earlier analysis of elements of this theme focusing on cartel use of instrumental and symbolic violence 
to shape the conflict environment and two concepts of communications theory can be found in John 
Sullivans November 2010 Cartel Info Ops: Power and Counter-power in Mexicos Drug War 
MountainRunner
 and April 2011 Attacks on Journalists and New Media in Mexicos Drug War A 
Power and Counter Power Assessment Small Wars Journal essays [2].
For a comparison of the components relating to this conflict refer to Table 1. Old Media vs New Media.  
That table provides a general overview of the difference between older and newer media forms. Overall 
the newer cyber-media form is far superior to the older media form as would be expected of a more 
networked, dynamic, and entrepreneurial set of informational technologies. However, it is still considered 
inferior to the industrial media by much of the status quo and older aged cohorts due to its anonymity of 
reporting, lack of accountability, and more illegitimate nature (e.g. most of the blogs post pictures with no 
concern over copyright issues).
The Mexican cartels and, more recently, cyber-vigilantes (both bloggers and hackers), have been involved 
in a number of identified information offensives/counter-offensives. It should be noted that these 
engagements are increasingly taking place in both human (4th dimensional) and cyber (5th dimensional) 
space. The hybrid expression of this is dual-dimensional operations ones that have both forms of 
dimensionality present [3]. These more complex operations are also now taking place in the conflict with 
the cartels. In addition, disruptive targetingalso known as Bond-Relationship Targeting (BRT) is 
being widely utilized by the cartels and directed against Mexican society [4]. The basic timelines in this 
information-based conflict are as follows:
Time 1: The First Cartel Information Offensive
The initial cartel information offensive sought to establish a climate of fear and compliance in their areas 
of operation. Tortured and brutalized victims were left out in public areas with graffiti scrawls, body 
writing/carving, and signs/banners attached to their lifeless bodies. This leveraged traditional media forms 
and helped to create turf/drug market control and initially establish cartel/gang reputations as deadly 
killers [5]. This was combined with a dual-dimensional initiative to utilize new forms of media and 
merge them with ghastly images of on camera torture and killing. YouTube and other social media 
platforms were then utilized from about 2005-2006 on as a conduit for the transmission of this information 
[6]. The disruptive effects on Mexican society are readily apparent and have resulted in an assault on the 
bonds and relationships that hold that nation togetherthe relations between the people, the government, 
and law enforcement/the military are becoming increasingly frayed. It has been combined with 
unrelenting corruption to graft cartel and gang influence, authority, and elements of narcoculture (
narcocultura) throughout that country.
Time 2: The Second Cartel Information Offensive
The cartels then sought in the various towns and cities to suppress and co-opt information produced and 
distributed by journalists/reporters and their employers. This has resulted in the targeting of media 
personnel, their families, and their places of work via threats, beatings/torture, kidnappings, killings, and 
workplace drive-bys/bombings. At least thirty Mexican journalists have either been killed or kidnapped 
and remain missing since 1992 [7]. The targeted killings have been recently increasing with eleven killed 
in 2011 alone [8]. As a result, the freedom of the press has been severely compromised in Mexico. Old 
media forms of reporting on narco-violence has virtually ceased in many of the cartel controlled cities or 
is being manipulated by the cartels for propaganda and psychological warfare purposes directed at 
opposing cartels, the Federal government, and the Mexican public.
Time 3: The First Vigilante Information Counter-Offensive
A response, or counter, to the second cartel information offensive was implemented by concerned 
Mexican citizens. They established social media networks derived from websites, such as Blog del 
Narco that came online in March 2010, texting, and tweeting that bypassed the cartel assault on press 
freedoms in Mexico. Many of these networks are city based and allow for real time reports to be filed in 
order to alert others to cartel violence, roadblocks, and patrols taking place in specific locations [9]. While 
the concerned citizens engaging in these social networks typically viewed themselves as non-combatants, 
they could also be interpreted as passive combatants (they reported on cartel activities only to protect 
other citizens) or even, and probably more accurately, as active combatants or cyber-vigilantes (who 
reported on cartel activities which may then allow Mexican authorities to arrest or kill cartel operatives) 
[10]. Still, because of the anonymity of reporting and complex nature of the social media networks (which 
could be hosted outside of Mexico and whose location/ownership could remain hidden), they posed a 
significantly harder media target for the cartels to contend with.
Time 4: The First Cartel Information Counter-Offensive
In September 2011, two incidents occurred that represented the initial cartel counter-offensive against the 
Mexican citizen/cyber-vigilante social networks. The first incident took place on the 13t  and is linked to 
Los Zetas:
The mutilated bodies of two bloggers were hung from a passenger overpass in the Mexican border 
town of Nuevo Laredo last month, with a sign attached saying, This will happen to all Internet 
busy bodies. [11].
 This happened for snitching on Frontera Al Rojo Vivo, read a note attached to the mans leg. 
Another, on the overpass, said: This will happen to all the Internet snitches (Frontera al Rojo 
Vivo, Blog Del Narco, or Denuncia Ciudadano). Be warned, weve got our eye on you. Signed, Z. 
[12] 
The next incident involved La nena de Laredo (Girl from Laredo) whose severed head wearing 
headphones was found next to a computer keyboard on 24 September. Her death is also attributed to the 
Los Zetas cartel [13]. The intent of this new counter-offensive is to attack the perceived weak point of the 
social networks the actual blogger physically in a cartel area of operations. The rationale is that, if 
enough of them are identified and tortured/killed, the bloggers too can be intimidated and neutralized just 
as have mainstream journalists and reporters.
Time 5: The First Vigilante Information Offensive [or a Cartel-on-Cartel Information Offensive]
In what mirrors the initial Time 1: The First Cartel Information Offensive: two pick-up trucks were 
left abandoned on 20 September 2011 in broad daylight on a busy Veracruz boulevard with 35 bodies in 
their beds and on the ground [14]. A few weeks later 46 more bodies were found in stash houses in 
Veracruz. Five hooded men dressed in black then appeared in a social media video distributed on 25 
September and claimed to be Mata Zetas (Kill Zetas) [who] are the armed wing of the people and 
that their only objective is to wipe out the Los Zetas cartel [15]. These vigilantes (anonymous 
warriorsproudly Mexican) are suspected of being linked to the Sinaloa cartel blood feud rivals to 
Los Zetas and, for that reason, it is unknown how to characterize this operation. It can be viewed either 
as a vigilante information offensive or a cartel-on-cartel information offensive. Federal Mexican 
complicity and indirect support of the Sinaloa cartel has also been suggested in this matter, but no 
definitive proof has as of yet surfaced to support these allegations. Further, eight of these vigilantes were 
said to be captured and tied to the New Generation cartel who are known Sinaloan allies [16].
Time 6: The Second Vigilante Information Counter-Offensive
In a strange twist in October 2011 the hacker group Anonymous then threatened the Los Zetas cartel for 
kidnapping one of its members from a street protest in Mexico. It did so via an online video [17] of one of 
its members wearing a Guy Fawkes mask as seen in the 2006 movie V f r Vendetta. He further 
underlines the groups international ties by speaking Spanish with the accent of a Spaniard while using 
Mexican slang. [18] If the member is not released, Anonymous intends to start hacking into secure 
websites/protected accounts and release sensitive information pertaining to the members of the Los Zetas 
cartel and those who work with them such as co-opted journalists, police officers, and taxi drivers. This 
counter-offensive escalates the war in cyberspace by moving away from licit information reporting to 
illicit information acquisition. To give it more credence: 
.Anonymous followed up its threat to the Zetas by defacing the website of former Tabasco state 
prosecutor Gustavo Rosario Torres, accused by anti-crime activists three years ago of discussing a 
$200,000 cocaine deal with a deputy on audio tape. With a Halloween background, a message 
splashed above the groups signature on Rosarios homepage read: Gustavo Rosario is Zeta. [19]
How this engagement will further develop is unknown but a 5 November ultimatum was given to Los 
Zetas. It is quite likely the initial pretext for the counter-offensive, the kidnapping of an Anonymous 
member, was fabricated and meant to cause initial ambiguity and discord within the ranks of Los Zetas. 
See this from a twitter thread:
@Sm0k34n0nStarting today #OpCartel begins. Heads up #Zetas! Love, @Sm0k34n0n @a o kitsu 
@AnonSyndiv cc @AnonymousIRC @YourAnonNews @MotormouthNews
@AnonKitsuCountless people live in fear everyday because they fear #Zetas. There was no 
kidnapped #anonymous member but this one still has targets set
@Sm0k34n0nLos #Zetas are the most dangerous drug cartel in Mexico. We dont take kindly to 
this is my crew #OpCartel [20].
Thus, it is far more plausible that Anonymous has simply come into this conflict, due to the new cartel 
policy of torturing and killing Mexican bloggersas an offensive cyber-vigilante force. The other 
possibility is that the hacker collective is simply toying with Los Zetas and seeking media attention but 
this would potentially be a very dangerous game to play. Individuals identified as working with Los Zetas, 
and the Anonymous hackers involved, all potentially risk being killed.  
Given the economic resources of Los Zetas and the other cartels, a future counter-move regardless of 
Anonymous intentions may be that of hiring additional cyber-mercenaries to bolster their defensive 
and offensive information operations capabilities [21]. Blowback on Mexican bloggers may also take 
place. A near term incident in which someone turns up headless wearing a Guy Fawkes mask, as a 
warning to Anonymous, is not beyond the realm of possibility.    
Conclusions
What is noticeably missing from the ongoing cartel and vigilante information offensives and counter-
offensives is any meaningful form of participation from the Mexican Federal government. Creating 
lawsnotably enacted only at the state level to punish the malicious spreading of rumors and fear via 
social networking messaging (the #twitterroristas) is not however meaningful participation [22]. While 
the Mexican government is quite comfortable with the industrial media of the 20th centuryit appears 
incapable of engaging in information operations leveraging social networking. At best it may be able to 
provide journalist/reporter protection but even this appears problematic given the silencing of much of 
the free press in Mexico.
The Mexican state is increasingly falling behind the action-reaction dynamic of the conflict as the criminal 
insurgencies migrate into 5th dimensional (cyber) space. This is somewhat perplexing given Mexican 
military operations against Los Zetas telecommunications networks in ten cities in the state of Veracruz in 
September 2011, although once again such networks represent old media (communications) based systems 
used for operational control of the Los Zetas insurgent forces [23]. Earlier though, from a December 2007 
Naval Post Graduate school thesis, it was recognized that:
In summary, Mexico has significantly increased its efforts to counter drug trafficking activities, as 
well as, insurgent and paramilitary groups within the country. Nevertheless, Mexicos military and 
law enforcement agencies have not established an Information Operations-based capability. 
Instead, Mexican government agencies communicate with the population primarily through the 
public affairs offices of each department. While this is a useful means to inform the public of 
government projects and military operations, it does not sufficiently strengthen the governments 
relationship with the population. As a result, some efforts of government agencies are inadequate, 
thus overlooking an opportunity to positively influence public opinion[24].
The Mexican Federal government would thus be well advised to either stand up its own internal new 
media/social networking capability and/or immediately contract out to a specialized group or corporation 
in order to do so. Rather than create an overly centralized and hierarchical response coming out of Mexico 
Citywhich simply will not workit should look to build a networked and distributed capability that 
would leverage the Mexican citizen/cyber-vigilante social networks already in existence. The intent would 
be to foster bottom up operational early warning and response, promote media flows necessary for 
Democratic governance, and, ultimately, rebuild trust across Mexican society by repairing the bonds and 
relationships being targeted by cartel activity.
Further, Mexico, as well as the United States, is going to have to learn how to appropriately operate in 21st
century conflicts against non-state threats. Many of the old rules and underlying assumptions concerning 
both warfare and policingsuch as dimensionality are no longer valid. According to John Sullivan and 
Adam Elkus:
A focus on understanding cyberspace in its original meaning and incorporating time as a 
dimension of operations may seem pedantic or perhaps overly academic. But understanding cyber 
and temporal dimensions of operations means synthesizing a mixture of old and new ideas to gain 
a better understanding of the modern operational spaceand is crucial to dealing with opposing 
force and environmental challenges [25].
This proposed approach may sound like a radical plan, but given the realities of 21st century conflict, it is 
far more sound than the current Mexican state trajectory of a) either ignoring cartel information operations 
altogether or b) responding to them from an industrial media perspective. War and conflict are 
dramatically changing as witnessed by the criminal insurgencies being waged across Mexico. For the 
Mexican Federal government to remain relevant in this evolving conflict, it must develop a 5th
dimensional (cyberspace) capability. Further, it must implement its own counter-informational operations 
leveraging the older media forms and then attempt to quickly learn how to engage in  dual-dimensional 
operations drawing upon the newer media forms to achieve synergistic effects.
Developing Stories
As this essay was being concluded, two stories were developing. The first dealt with the ongoing 
Anonymous vs Los Zetas conflict. Conflicting reports have been circulating that initially Anonymous had 
called off their targeting of this cartel [26] and later that it was still a go [27]. These reports were 
derived from Twitter feeds and social networking statements made by individuals said to be members of 
this hacker collective. The true status of the Anonymous OpCartel counter-offensive is currently highly 
ambiguous.
The second story concerns the present status of Blog del Narco. Since about 24 October 2011, viewers 
have been having trouble accessing the site:
The government and some individuals want to censor us, they’ve denounced us to Blogger, where 
the site is hosted for security reasons and because we do not have the resources for a dedicated 
server, replied an anonymous representative via e-mail when the Knight Center asked what 
caused the site’s technical problems [28].
The new site is MilCincuenta.com but technical issues appear to also exist. This development follows the 
earlier Los Zetas threats against a number of blogs in the Nuevo Laredo incident on 13 September 2011. 
Since that time, two of the blogs have been shut down after threatening messages appeared on them. The 
user was worried because the blog accounts had personal information in them [29]. This marks two more 
victories for Los Zetas in the Time 4: The First Cartel Information Counter-Offensive. What the future 
status of Blog del Narco will now be is unknown, however, those behind it have shown no intention of 
shutting it down. 
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